John Kunzler
Risk and Error Management
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United Kingdom
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur, has drawn a clearer – and more practical – boundary in litigation practice: the distinction between the ‘conduct of litigation’ and ‘carrying on the conduct of litigation.’
In doing so, the Court has confirmed that modern delivery models, including the use of non-qualified persons, remain permissible. The mere fact that tasks falling within conduct of litigation are carried out by unauthorised individuals does not, without more, amount to a breach.
However, the decision sharpens a more fundamental question for firms: Who is actually responsible for litigation in substance?
The focus is no longer on activity – who drafted, who communicated, who carried out the task – but on the delegation, appropriate controls, and supervision of the work.
1. ‘Conduct of litigation’ and ‘carrying on’ are not the same.
The Court of Appeal confirmed that:
The critical issue is who is ‘carrying on’ those activities.
2. Delegation is lawful with caveats.
Work may be delegated where:
In those circumstances, it is the authorised person who is ‘carrying on’ the conduct of litigation, not the individual performing the task.
3. Proper management supervision underpins lawful delegation.
The court confirmed that:
Thus, supervision is the mechanism by which the firm demonstrates it retains carriage of the litigation.
While the Court of Appeal places clear emphasis on supervision as the mechanism by which an authorised solicitor demonstrates they are “carrying on” the conduct of litigation, existing regulatory guidance does not fully align with this test.
The Solicitors Regulation Authority requires firms to maintain effective systems and controls for supervision, ensuring work is competently carried out and risks are appropriately managed. However, that framework is expressed at a high level.
In particular, current guidance does not:
This potentially creates a gap between regulatory expectations and the test articulated by the Court of Appeal, albeit that the Court of Appeal has Mazurs confirmed that it is unlikely that the following list would fall within the statutory definition of “conduct of litigation”: pre-litigation work, giving legal advice in connection with court proceedings, conducting correspondence with the opposing party on behalf of clients, gathering evidence, instructing and liaising with experts and counsel, signing a statement of truth in respect of a statement of case, and signing any other document that the CPR permits to be signed by a legal representative, as defined by CPR Part 2.3.
In the absence of further guidance, firms should proceed on the basis that it will not be sufficient to demonstrate that supervision exists in principle - it must be proportionate, targeted and capable of evidencing real control. Many firms can evidence this and have done so for many years, and may not need to change. However, litigation is a wide field and control and supervision vary significantly. Given the likely focus in this area, we consider all firms should test whether control can be demonstrated by reviewing their litigation practice areas.
Firms should therefore consider:
Even if such a review does not reveal any significant concerns, it is likely to surface areas where practice on the ground diverges from what management understand and expect.
The practical effect of the decision is a shift in focus concerning conduct of litigation.
Supervision is not just a matter of good practice - it is the mechanism by which firms demonstrate that they retain carriage of the litigation.
Risk and Error Management
United Kingdom
Risk and Error Management
United Kingdom